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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jerome Harris was charged with, tried for, and ultimately convicted of a single 
count of attempted first degree arson and a “persistent violator” sentence enhancement.  
On appeal, Mr. Harris contends the State failed to offer sufficient evidence to support 
the jury’s persistent violator finding and, therefore, the enhancement must be vacated.  
Specifically, he argues that although the State offered substantial evidence from which 
a rational trier of fact could find that Mr. Harris had previously been convicted of one 
prior felony and two other offenses, it offered no evidence that either of those other two 
offenses were felonies. 
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The factual and procedural histories of this case were previously detailed in 
Mr. Harris’ Appellant’s Brief and, therefore, are not repeated herein. 
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ISSUE 
Did the State offer sufficient evidence that Mr. Harris was previously convicted of two 
felonies, so as to support its finding that he is a “persistent violator of law” within the 
meaning of I.C. § 19-2514? 
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ARGUMENT 
Because The State Failed To Offer Substantial Evidence That Mr. Harris Was 
Previously Convicted Of Two Felonies, There Is Insufficient Evidence To Sustain The 
Jury’s Finding That Mr. Harris Is A “Persistent Violator Of Law” Under I.C. § 19-2514 
In his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Harris argued that, in order for Idaho’s persistent 
violator sentencing enhancement to apply, the State must first prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant has previously been convicted of two or more 
felonies.  (See App. Br., pp.6-7.)  He then conceded that the State offered sufficient 
evidence to prove he had been convicted of one felony in Ada County, and two other 
offenses in Kootenai County, and he argued that the State failed to offer any evidence 
that the Kootenai County offenses were felonies.  (See App. Br., pp.7-9.)  Accordingly, 
he concluded the State failed to offer sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict with 
regard to the persistent violator enhancement.  (See App. Br., p.9.) 
In response, the State asks this Court to affirm the verdict with regard to the 
persistent violator enhancement.  (See Resp. Br., pp.4-13.)  It seems to offer three 
arguments in support of this request: (1) the State does not have to prove the 
defendant’s prior convictions were felonies if they were Idaho convictions, as opposed 
to out-of-state convictions (see Resp. Br., pp.6-9); (2) the State does not have to offer 
evidence that the defendant’s prior convictions were felonies because this Court can 
determine, as a matter of law, that they are (see Resp. Br., pp.6, 11-12); and (3) the 
State did, in fact, offer sufficient evidence that Mr. Harris’ prior convictions are felonies 
because the jury could have guessed as much based on the nature of the offenses (see 
Resp. Br., p.12).  These arguments, however, are unconvincing. 
The State’s first argument is that the authorities relied upon by Mr. Harris—a line 
of cases clearly holding that, for purposes of the persistent violator enhancement, the 
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State has the burden of proving the prior convictions were for felony offenses, and that 
the State may satisfy this burden by offering judgments of conviction that say the 
convictions were for felony offenses or by presenting to the jury admissible copies of the 
statutes indicating the crimes of conviction were felonies—are all distinguishable from 
the present case because those cases arose in the context of prior convictions from 
other states.  (See Resp. Br., pp.6-9 (citing State v. McClain, 154 Idaho 742 (Ct. App. 
2012), and State v. Williams, 103 Idaho 635 (Ct. App. 1982).)  The State’s suggestion is 
clear:  if the prior conviction arose in another jurisdiction, the State must offer sufficient 
evidence for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that it was a felony; however, if 
the conviction arose in Idaho, the jury need not find the prior offense was a felony.  (See 
Resp. Br., pp.6-9.) 
The State’s argument is unsupportable under the persistent violator statute and 
the cases interpreting that statute.  The statute provides, “Any person convicted for the 
third time of the commission of a felony, whether the previous convictions were had 
within the state of Idaho or were had outside the state of Idaho, shall be considered a 
persistent violator of law . . . .”  I.C. § 19-2514.  Thus, it treats all prior felony convictions 
the same, regardless of the jurisdiction from which they arose.  Because the plain 
language of the statute is clear and unambiguous in this regard, this Court may not read 
into it disparate standards depending on the jurisdiction in which the prior conviction 
arose.  See Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893 (2011).  
Furthermore, although McClain, Williams, and a third case, State v. Pacheco, 134 Idaho 
367 (Ct. App. 2000), all involved prior out-of-state convictions (Oregon, Washington, 
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and California convictions, respectively),1 that does not mean a different standard 
applies to prior Idaho convictions.  In fact, under an analogous statute dealing with 
felonies generally, the Idaho Supreme Court recently held the State to its statutory 
burden of proving even in-state offenses are felonies.  In State v. Yermola, 159 Idaho 
785, 367 P.3d 180 (2016), the Supreme Court analyzed Idaho’s willful concealment of 
evidence statute, which characterizes the crime of willful concealment as a 
misdemeanor if the evidence concealed concerns a civil matter or a misdemeanor 
criminal offense, and as a felony, if the evidence concerns “a felony offense.”  I.C. § 18-
2603.  The Supreme Court held that in a prosecution for felony concealment of 
evidence, the State must prove to the jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the subject 
offense is a felony.  Yermola, 367 P.3d at 182-83.  It reached this holding despite the 
fact that the subject offense in that case was an alleged Idaho offense (grand theft).  So 
just as the Yermola Court applied the plain language of section 18-2603 to in-state 
felonies, so too should this Court apply the plain language of the persistent violator 
statute to in-state felonies. 
The State’s next argument is that the State does not have to offer evidence that 
the defendant’s prior convictions were felonies because this Court can determine, as a 
matter of law, that they are.  (See Resp. Br., pp.6, 11-12.)  However, a virtually identical 
argument was rejected in Yermola and, in the process, the Yermola Court, drew a 
parallel to the persistent violator context: 
                                            
1 See also State v. Smith, 116 Idaho 553, 560 (Ct. app. 1989) (discussing the State’s 
obligation to prove the prior convictions were felonies, and holding that the State met 
that burden, but not revealing whether the prior felony convictions were from Idaho or a 
different jurisdiction). 
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In the instant case, the State argues that whether the subject 
offense is a felony is not an issue for the jury to decide . . . .  The State 
argues in its brief on appeal that “it is not the province of the jury to 
classify a specific offense. . . .  It is the Idaho Legislature's role to decide 
which criminal offenses are felonies, and which are not.”  This argument is 
nonsensical.  The jury would not be classifying the subject offense.  Its 
role would simply be to determine whether the evidence had proved that 
the legislature classified it as a felony.  When a jury decides whether the 
elements of a crime or civil cause of action have been proved, it is not 
determining what those elements should be.  It is only deciding whether 
those elements have been proved. 
Having the jury determine whether the crime being investigated 
was a felony is not conceptually different from the jury deciding whether a 
prior criminal offense of a defendant charged with being a felon in 
possession of a firearm is a felony.  It is likewise not conceptually different 
from the jury deciding whether a defendant is a persistent violator, which 
juries have been required to do in Idaho since at least 1918. . . . 
Yermola, 367 P.3d at 182-83.  Further, the State’s argument fails to account for cases 
such as McClain, Williams, Smith, and Pacheco, where it was squarely held that the 
question of whether a prior offense was a felony is a fact that must be found by the jury, 
not a question of law to be decided by the court.  If the question of whether a prior Idaho 
conviction was for a felony can be decided as a matter of law, so too could the 
determination of whether a prior out-of-state conviction was a felony be decided as a 
matter of law.  But the Idaho Court of Appeals has never taken that approach; instead, 
the Court of Appeals, like the Supreme Court in Yermola, has consistently held that the 
question of whether an offense is a felony is one that is to be decided by the jury. 
Finally, the State argues that because the Kootenai County convictions at issue 
were for trafficking in methamphetamine and delivery of methamphetamine, and that 
they resulted in prison sentences, the jurors should have known that they were felonies.  
(See Resp. Br., p.12.)  The State claims that because this would have been a 
“reasonable inference,” there was sufficient evidence to support the persistent violator 
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enhancement.  (Resp. Br., p.12.)  However, that would not have been a reasonable 
inference; rather, it would have been rank speculation.  As the Yermola Court explained, 
it is the Legislature’s job to determine which offenses are felonies.  Yermola, 159 Idaho 
at 183.  Although one would hope the Legislature’s determinations in this regard would 
be logical, consistent, and intuitive, there is no requirement that they be so.  Thus, while 
one could speculate that the offenses of delivery of methamphetamine and trafficking in 
methamphetamine are felonies, that need not necessarily be the case.  So if the jury 
based its verdict on the belief that the crimes of delivery and trafficking in 
methamphetamine must be felonies, that verdict was based upon nothing more than the 
jurors’ guesses, not the evidence in the case. 
 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and in his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Harris 
respectfully requests that this Court vacate the jury’s special verdict finding him to be a 
persistent violator, as well as his sentence, and that it remand his case to the district 
court for re-sentencing on the un-enhanced crime of attempted first degree arson. 
 DATED this 17th day of June, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
 8 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 17th day of June, 2016, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF, by causing to be placed a 
copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
 
JEROME NATHANIEL HARRIS 
INMATE #56425  
ISCC 
PO BOX 70010 
BOISE ID 83707 
  
JASON D SCOTT 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
E-MAILED BRIEF  
  
DAVID LORELLO 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
 
KENNETH K JORGENSEN  
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      EVAN A. SMITH 
      Administrative Assistant 
 
ERL/eas 
 
